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Abstract 
 
We use path analysis to investigate how corporate tax avoidance is priced in bond yields and 
bank loan spreads. We find that approximately one half of the total effect of tax avoidance on 
bond yields is explained through the negative effect of tax avoidance on future pre-tax cash 
flow levels and volatility and, to a lesser extent, lower information quality. The effects of these 
mediating variables are much less pronounced for bank loan spreads. The results of additional 
cross-sectional analyses indicate that, relative to bond investors, banks are able to reduce 
information asymmetry problems more effectively, given their access to firms’ private 
information and greater ability to monitor borrowers. 
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 1. Introduction 
Prior evidence indicates that bank loan spreads and public bond offering yields are 
increasing in corporate tax avoidance, with the economic effects being substantially larger in 
bonds than bank loans (Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2014). However, the literature has not 
investigated the channels through which borrowers’ tax avoidance activities influence the 
spreads of their newly-issued debt. We examine the importance of the paths through which 
corporate tax avoidance affects bond yields and bank loan spreads and provide additional cross-
sectional analyses on firm characteristics that likely affect the relationship between corporate 
tax avoidance on bond yields.  
We consider two paths through which tax avoidance could be positively associated with 
bond yields and loan spreads. First, corporate tax avoidance activities could induce higher 
uncertainty about the magnitude and volatility of the firms' future cash flows, which is viewed 
negatively by lenders.1 This future cash flow uncertainty due to tax avoidance comes about 
because of an increased probability of IRS audits, penalties, and interest charges, and also 
because of managerial rent extraction. Firm managers can use complex tax structures to enable 
and obscure the expropriation of firm resources (e.g., Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007; 
Dhaliwal, Huang, Moser, and Periera 2011; Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 2014).  
Second, corporate tax avoidance activities contribute to a decrease in the quality and 
transparency of the financial statements. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. (2007) 
argue that tax avoidance, especially when it involves more aggressive positions, often results 
in opaque reporting. Similarly, Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2018) find that tax-avoiding 
firms are characterized by a less transparent external information environment due to these 
activities' role in increasing the complexity of the firm. Given that lenders rely on firm 
                                                 
1 The classical Merton (1974) model suggests that debt investors demand compensation for exposure to total asset 
volatility risk, which is affected by both systematic and unsystematic risk factors. Corporate tax avoidance is 
likely to affect asset volatility through its impact on the firm’s cash flows. 
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disclosures to estimate default risk as well as the rate of recovery if default occurs, they are 
likely to view negatively more opaque financial statements. This argument particularly applies 
to bond investors who can only access public disclosures. 
Our empirical tests use a sample of 7,945 individual bonds issued by 1,035 U.S. 
domiciled non-financial firms over the period 1990-2007 and 6,015 bank loans obtained by 
1,297 firms over the same time period.  We employ a number of proxies to capture corporate 
tax avoidance. Our first measure, CETR5, is the ratio of taxes paid in cash to pre-tax income 
net of total special items averaged over a five-year period just prior to the bond issue or bank 
loan origination (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008).2 Our second measure, TA_CASH5, is 
the firm’s CETR5 less the mean of the year-industry-size CETR5 (Balakrishnan, Blouin, and 
Guay 2018). Lower values of these first two measures indicate more aggressive tax avoidance. 
Our third and final measure, CV_CETR5, is the coefficient of variation of the cash ETR 
estimated over the same 5-year period as CETR5 (McGuire, Neuman, Olson, and Omer 2016). 
Higher values of CV_CETR5 indicate more and riskier tax avoidance. These latter two 
measures extend the Hasan et al. (2014) results to examine tax avoidance at the riskier end of 
the spectrum, which is more likely to affect lenders’ assessments of borrowers’ credit risk.  
Using all firms on Compustat (other than financials and utilities) that have available 
data, regardless of whether they issued bonds or obtained bank loans in the current year, we 
document that firms engaging in corporate tax avoidance activities experience significant pre-
tax cash flow shortfalls and greater pre-tax cash flow volatility over the next five years. We 
also find that corporate tax avoidance predicts, to a lesser extent, lower information quality. 
The ability of the tax avoidance measures to predict lower pre-tax cash flow levels and higher 
pre-tax cash flow volatility as well as higher information opacity confirms that these three 
                                                 
2  Hasan et al. (2014) use the Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax difference measure, which is the U.S. portion 
of total book tax differences, the Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) adjusted permanent book tax differences, and a 
cash effective tax rate, all estimated on an annual basis. We have replicated our results using yearly effective tax 
rate measures, and our inferences are similar. 
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variables could serve as channels or paths through which tax avoidance may lead to higher debt 
spreads.  
We next employ a path analysis to assess the mechanism through which corporate tax 
avoidance potentially increases the cost of bonds and bank loans.3  For both the bond and loan 
samples, we find, consistent with results for the Compustat sample, that the three mediating 
variables (future cash flow levels, future cash flow volatility, and future information opacity) 
are all significantly associated with tax avoidance in the predicted directions:  more tax 
avoidance is associated with lower future pre-tax cash flow levels, higher future pre-tax cash 
flow volatility, and lower information quality. These associations are a necessary condition for 
the variables to play a mediating role.  
We also document that corporate tax avoidance has a significant direct effect on debt 
spreads in both bond and loan samples. Therefore, even after including the mediating variables 
in the regression of tax avoidance on bond yields and loan spreads, the estimated coefficient 
on the tax avoidance variable is still significant, with the significance on each tax avoidance 
variable being similar across both bonds and loans, suggesting that the mediating variables do 
not fully explain the association between tax avoidance and debt spreads.  
Finally, we document that all three mediating variables are generally significant in the 
predicted directions when added to the regression of bond yields and loan spreads on each tax 
avoidance measure. The standardized coefficients and significance levels are higher in the bond 
sample, consistent with the interpretation that these mediating variables play a larger role for 
bonds than for bank loans. We find that approximately one half of the total effect of tax 
avoidance on bond yields is explained through the negative effect of tax avoidance on future 
pre-tax cash flow levels and volatility and, to a lesser extent, lower information quality.  
                                                 
3 We use a path analysis to answer how a variable, X, affects another variable, Y, through a third mediating 
variable, Z. In contrast, we use an interaction analysis to answer when a moderating variable impacts the 
magnitude (i.e., moderates) the relation between X and Y. The moderating variable is not affected by X. Baron 
and Kenny (1986) provide a discussion on mediation versus moderation.  
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In our last set of analyses, we further investigate the role of two sets of firm 
characteristics that potentially affect the association between corporate tax avoidance and debt 
spreads: (1) lender wealth expropriation incentives, which reflect conflicts of interest between 
equity-holders and lenders, and (2) the probability of an IRS audit, which reflects an alternative 
monitoring source that reduces lender risk but also increases tax risk. We capture lenders’ 
wealth expropriation incentives using four empirical constructs: the presence of strong 
antitakeover provisions, the presence of large blockholders, high managerial equity incentives, 
and high credit risk.  
Overall, our findings indicate that corporate tax avoidance increases the cost of bond 
financing but not bank financing when managers have incentives to expropriate lenders’ wealth 
and firms face a high probability of an IRS audit.  These results suggest that, relative to bond 
investors, banks are better able to reduce information asymmetry problems and effectively 
monitor borrowers’ activities, given banks’ better access to private information. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the prior literature. First, we provide new 
evidence on how tax avoidance affects public debt yields and bank loans spreads, thus 
explaining the mechanism driving the results in Hasan et al. (2014), who document a positive 
association between tax avoidance and the cost of debt. We document that tax avoidance 
predicts reduced future pre-tax cash flow levels, increased future pre-tax cash flow volatility, 
and lower future information quality, and that tax avoidance influences bond yields and bank 
loan spreads through these mediating variables. In addition, our analyses rely on two new 
measures of tax avoidance that likely better capture more-risky tax planning and also show that 
bond yields (but not loan spreads) are larger in firms with high lender expropriation incentives 
and IRS audit probability, highlighting important information frictions in bond markets. 
 Second, we add to the rapidly developing literature that investigates the impact of 
reported financial information and its quality on the cost of debt securities (e.g., Yu 2005; 
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Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005; Sengupta 1998; Bharat, Sunder, and Sunder 
2008; Easton, Monahan, and Vasvari 2009; Ghosh and Moon 2010; Shivakumar, Urcan, 
Vasvari, and Zhang 2011; DeFond and Zhang 2014). We show that measures of corporate tax 
activities inferred from the firm's reported income statement are relevant variables that are 
priced in public and private debt markets not because of their impact on the quality of the 
accounting information but because they are a leading indicator of future cash flow problems.   
 Third, our results provide an additional explanation on why more firms do not engage 
in tax shelters and corporate tax avoidance, given the possibility of substantial tax savings (e.g., 
Weisbach 2002). Our evidence suggests that major providers of capital—public debtholders—
view corporate tax avoidance in a negative light, especially when incentives to expropriate their 
wealth are in place and the probability of an IRS audit is high, consistent with Graham and 
Tucker (2006) and Wilson (2009), who document a strong negative relation between leverage 
and the incidence of tax shelter activity. In addition, given the results in Goh, Lee, Lim, and 
Shevlin (2016), who show that the cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms, our findings 
further support the negative association between leverage and corporate tax avoidance by 
showing that tax avoidance makes borrowing more expensive relative to equity, thus 
incentivizing the firms to borrow less. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses 
and summarizes the prior literature. Section 3 discusses the sample selection, variables and the 
research design. Section 4 presents our findings, and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Prior literature and predictions  
           2.1 Prior literature 
Hasan et al. (2014) document that both bank loan spreads and public bond issuance 
yields are increasing in corporate tax avoidance. They argue that, while corporate tax savings 
increase current period after-tax cash flows, thus lowering default risk, lenders might perceive 
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increased risks associated with tax avoidance activities and demand higher loan spreads and 
bond yields.  The perceived increased risks could arise from increased information risks (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006; Kim, et al. 2011; Balakrishnan, et al. 2018), lower and possibly more 
volatile future cash flows arising through increased agency risks (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
2009; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010; Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013), and increased 
IRS audit risk (Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000; Wilson 2009). Two somewhat related 
papers examine the relation between corporate bond ratings and book-tax differences (BTDs, 
both temporary and total). Crabtree and Maher (2009) find that firms in the extreme quintiles 
of BTDs (defined on an industry-year basis) are rated as riskier by rating agencies. Ayers, 
Laplante, and McGuire (2010) also examine the same general research question by looking at 
changes in corporate bond ratings as a function of changes in book-tax differences. However, 
neither of these papers investigates the mechanisms (uncertainty of future pre-tax cash flows 
versus information quality) through which corporate tax avoidance activities affect bond yields 
and loan spreads.   
2.2 Path analysis predictions 
There are several possible mechanisms through which corporate tax avoidance might 
lead to the documented higher bond yields and bank loan spreads in the prior literature. First, 
corporate tax avoidance activities, particularly the more aggressive ones, could reduce future 
pre-tax cash flows and increase future pre-tax cash flow volatility due to tax risks. These risks 
come about because of higher probability of IRS audits, interest, and penalties. For example, 
Wilson (2009) reports that, among his sample of tax shelter participants, the median savings 
from the tax shelters is $66.5 million, with the IRS assessing interest and penalties on the tax 
shelters of $58 million. Complex tax structures can also allow firm managers (and others) to 
expropriate firm resources (i.e., extract managerial rents), which may or may not include the 
cash tax savings from the tax-avoidance activity (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Such wealth 
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expropriation reduces the after-tax cash flows to lenders and increases the volatility of future 
cash flows. Both lower levels and more volatile cash flows will lead lenders to require ex ante 
price protection via higher bond yields and loan spreads. 
Second, in the spirit of Scholes et al. (2014), there are non-tax costs associated with 
corporate tax avoidance activities, such as lower quality and transparency of the financial 
statement numbers that potentially impair lenders’ ability to monitor the borrowers. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) and Desai, et al. (2007) argue that aggressive tax avoidance often leads to 
opaque financial reporting that conceals either the purpose of the underlying transaction or the 
very existence of the transaction to escape detection by tax authorities. In the same spirit, Frank, 
et al. (2009) document that tax aggressiveness is associated with the reporting of more 
discretionary accruals, while Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) find that corporate tax avoidance 
activities are strongly associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk, consistent with the 
opacity introduced by tax avoidance facilitating the hoarding and accumulation of bad news 
for extended periods.4  
Finally, Balakrishnan et al. (2018) document that tax avoidance activities result in less 
transparent information because these activities increase the complexity of the firm. Therefore, 
if corporate tax avoidance increases the opacity of financial information, lenders will face 
higher adverse selection and moral hazard problems that should be reflected in higher bond 
offering yields and bank loan spreads. However, because banks have exclusive relationships 
with borrowers through prior lending, cash management, or advisory activities, they have 
access to private information and therefore are less exposed to these agency problems (e.g., 
Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984). Further, Gallemore. Gipper, and Maydew (2019) 
provide evidence on banks’ role as tax planning advisors. Thus, banks gain access to more 
                                                 
4 A recent line of research argues that firms with aggressive financial reporting are less likely to be tax aggressive 
to avoid the suspicion of investors, SEC, or IRS (e.g., Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2004; Lennox, Lisowsky, 
and Pittman 2013). 
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private information about firms’ tax planning activities and gain better insights on the potential 
outcomes of these activities. Additionally, if banks actually help design tax plans, they will 
presumably do so with their own interests in mind. These arguments suggest that borrowers’ 
poor information quality due to tax avoidance activities will have a lower impact on bank loan 
spreads.  
2.3 Cross-sectional predictions  
Similar to Hasan et al. (2014), we argue that the relationship between corporate tax 
avoidance and debt spreads is affected by firm characteristics that are ex ante proxies for the 
increased credit risks triggered by corporate tax avoidance. Because these firm variables are 
not directly impacted by firm-specific tax avoidance activities, we view them as moderating 
variables and make cross-sectional predictions.   
First, we focus on four variables that capture the extent to which shareholders and 
managers have incentives to expropriate lenders’ wealth: (1) The presence of strong 
antitakeover provisions, (2) the presence of large blockholders, (3) high CEO equity risk-taking 
incentives, (4) high credit risk. We expect the positive association between bond yields/bank 
loan spreads and tax avoidance to be stronger if indeed these measures capture borrowers’ 
incentives to expropriate lenders’ wealth. Strong antitakeover provisions, coded using the 
methodology of Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003), are an indication of poor governance 
because they shield the firm from the market for corporate control, which is viewed as a strong 
external disciplining mechanism.5 Ineffective monitoring by the corporate takeover market 
could allow entrenched managers to exploit tax avoidance activities for personal gains (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006). However, the adoption of antitakeover amendments is not necessarily 
a sign of lender wealth expropriation. Avoiding takeovers that are motivated by wealth 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge the likely endogeneity of the corporate takeover index. For example, a growing firm with large 
needs for outside debt financing has more incentives to adopt better governance practices in order to lower its cost 
of debt. 
10 
 
transfers from lenders to stockholders (Shleifer and Summers 1988) or increasing the credit 
risk of the firm by adding debt or bank loans (Warga and Welch 1993) while preserving cash 
through corporate tax avoidance schemes can be beneficial to lenders.  
The presence of large blockholders is viewed negatively by lenders, because these 
shareholders have both the incentive and ability to expropriate resources (e.g., Lisowsky et al. 
2011). Tax avoidance activities, particularly the more aggressive ones, offer large blockholders 
an opportunity for expropriation (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). An 
alternative argument can be made for the role of blockholders as outside monitors of the 
management of the firm (Jensen 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). These shareholders have the 
incentives (due to the large size of their investment) and resources to uncover managerial 
opportunism that also negatively affects lenders’ wealth.  
Regarding high CEO equity incentives, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document 
that a higher sensitivity of a CEO's wealth to stock volatility (i.e., vega) is associated with 
riskier policy choices (more investment in R&D; less investment in property, plant, and 
equipment; more focus on fewer lines of business; and higher leverage). All of these activities 
are detrimental to lenders' wealth because they increase the riskiness of the underlying assets 
and facilitate wealth expropriation. In addition, Rego and Wilson (2012) document a positive 
association between vega and corporate tax avoidance. However, another effect of increased 
vega is to expose managers to more risk. If CEOs are undiversified with respect to firm-specific 
wealth, they are exposed to more risk than diversified shareholders. Accordingly, CEOs may 
engage in less risky activities, which are beneficial to lenders. 
When firms are credit risky (i.e., when they have speculative grade debt or bank loans), 
equity-holders have strong incentives to engage in risky activities that expropriate lenders' 
wealth due to their convex payoff function (Easton et al., 2009). This is because equity-holders 
hold a call option that is relatively close to being out-of-the-money vis-à-vis the call option 
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embedded in an investment grade bond or bank loan. As a result, high credit risk likely reflects 
incentives to expropriate lenders’ wealth via asset substitution (selling less risky assets and 
investing in risky assets). 
Second, we investigate the role of increased tax risk on the relationship between debt 
spreads and tax avoidance. Given that the IRS reduces the ability of managers to act 
opportunistically by employing tax-planning activities, it is likely protecting lenders’ wealth. 
In support of this argument, Guedhami and Pittman (2008) find that the probability of an IRS 
audit decreases bond yields among private firms, suggesting that IRS monitoring plays a 
valuable monitoring role. Further, Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) find that IRS audits 
deter corporate tax avoidance. These arguments suggest a weaker association between tax 
avoidance and bond yields and bank loan spreads when the probability of an IRS audit is higher. 
However, lenders could be concerned about the risks associated with an IRS audit of a firm’s 
tax avoidance activities, because such an audit can trigger large payouts, introducing 
uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows (Wilson 2009).  
Similar to the arguments we provide for the path analysis, we expect that the moderating 
role of lender wealth expropriation incentives and high IRS risk on the relationship between 
tax avoidance and debt spreads to be more muted for loan spreads. Banks are effective monitors 
due to their concentrated ownership of the debt and requirements for very strict financial 
covenants that give banks control rights and facilitate frequent renegotiations of loan contracts 
(e.g., Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Roberts 2015).  
3. Sample selection and variable definitions 
In this section, we first present our bond and bank loan sample selection process and 
provide background information on the data sources to build our two samples. We then describe 
our main variables of interest: the cost of public debt (bond) financing and bank loan spreads, 
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and the tax avoidance measures. Finally, we discuss the research design and the set of bond 
and loan attributes and firm-specific characteristics used as controls in the multivariate tests. 
3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
For our bond sample, we start with the universe of bonds in the Mergent Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD) issued between 1990 and 2007. Our sample ends in 2007 because 
we need forward years of data for estimating uncertainty about future cash flows and 
information quality.  FISD provides bond-specific information such as bond size, issue date, 
rating, coupon rate and frequency, and other features, as well as borrower-specific information. 
We eliminate bond issues that have missing ratings and bond-specific information; that have 
pay variable coupon payments (a minority in the database); that are convertible into common 
stock; that are not issued by firms incorporated in the United States; and that are privately 
placed under Rule 144A.6 
We apply several additional filters to this initial dataset to obtain our final bond sample. 
First, we select all bonds for which the U.S. borrower could be manually matched to 
Compustat, based on company name and industry membership. Second, we exclude financial 
companies (i.e., those whose SIC code is between 6000 and 6999). These companies tend to 
issue a large number of bonds to finance their operations or off-balance sheet trusts they 
sponsor, and are highly regulated. Finally, we require bond issuers to have available data in 
Compustat for relevant firm-specific variables and the tax avoidance measures. Our final bond 
sample contains 7,945 individual bonds issued that cover 1,035 firms between 1990 and 2007.  
For our bank loan sample, we use a sample of syndicated loans from DealScan, which 
contains data on syndicated loans at the time of their origination. For consistency with our bond 
sample, we collect data for bank loans issued by U.S. firms between 1990 and 2007. To ensure 
                                                 
6 Rule 144A does not require bonds to be registered with the SEC. Thus, borrowers under Rule 144A might not 
provide U.S. GAAP financial statements. Further, these bonds are less liquid than public bond issues because they 
can be purchased by only a limited set of qualified financial institutions. 
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comparability, we remove loans with missing ratings and loan facilities with non-floating 
interest rates and apply the data filters we used to obtain the bond sample. Our final loan sample 
contains 6,015 individual loans that were issued by 1,297 firms between 1990 and 2007. 
Table 1 presents and compares descriptive statistics for the bond sample and the bank 
loan sample. Firms obtaining bank loans are significantly smaller, are more profitable, and 
have higher market-to-book ratios consistent with growth firms using banks as their source of 
external debt because of information asymmetry issues around valuation and monitoring of 
firms. Consistent with the banks’ role in mitigating information asymmetry and providing 
closer monitoring of borrowers, firms obtaining bank loans have a significantly lower 
percentage of assets in property plant and equipment (tangible assets), a higher percentage of 
intangible assets, more foreign income, a higher frequency of NOL carryforwards, and a higher 
volatility of pre-tax cash flows. Finally, consistent with Hasan et al. (2014), the average bank 
loan size is significantly larger than the average bond size. 
3.2. Measures of tax avoidance  
 We use three measures of tax avoidance. Our first measure is the cash effective tax rate, 
computed as the ratio of total taxes paid in cash scaled by total pre-tax income net of total 
special items, each summed separately over the last five years prior to the bond issuance date 
(CETR5).7 Summing over the five-year period reduces the effect of transitory fluctuations in 
cash taxes paid. This measure reflects both permanent and temporary book-tax differences. 
Examples of such tax planning are investments in tax havens with lower foreign tax rates, 
investments in tax exempt or tax-favored assets, and participation in tax shelters (e.g., Wilson 
2009). By focusing on cash taxes paid, this measure avoids the overstatement of 
current tax expense due to the accounting for the income tax benefits of employee stock options 
                                                 
7 Dyreng et al. (2008) argue that single-year ETR suffers from significant year-to-year variation and is a poor 
proxy of long-run tax avoidance. 
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during our pre-SFAS 123R sample period (see Hanlon and Shevlin 2003). We remove 
observations with negative total pre-tax income net of total special items over the last five years 
and truncate the measures to the range [0,1].  
Our second measure is from Balakrishnan et al. (2018) and is intended to capture 
aggressive tax avoidance. Balakrishnan et al. argue that “other things equal, similar-sized firms 
in the same industry are expected to have similar tax planning opportunities. And, among firms 
with similar tax planning opportunities, firms with unusually low tax liabilities can be 
considered more tax aggressive” (p. 10).  Thus, adapting their procedure, we adjust our firm-
specific CETR5 by the same time period mean industry-size CETR5. We sort firm size 
independently of industry and base industry on the Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
Specifically, we define TA_CASH5 as CETR5 less the mean year-industry-size CETR5. 
Negative values indicate the firm paid less taxes during that time period relative to other 
similar-size firms in that industry. In other words, the firm was more tax aggressive. 
Our third measure is intended to capture risky tax avoidance activities. Following 
McGuire, et al. (2016), we calculate the coefficient of variation of the annual cash ETR over 
the same five-year period as the above two measures.  Specifically, we calculate CV_CETR5 
as the standard deviation of the annual cash ETR divided by the mean of the annual cash ETRs. 
Higher values of CV_CETR5 indicate more-risky tax avoidance activities. This measure, or 
variations of it, have been used in Nueman, McGuire, and Omer (2013), Guenther, Matsunaga, 
and Williams (2017), and Neuman, Omer, and Schmidt (2015). 
Table 1 shows that the bank loan sample exhibits lower tax avoidance—higher CETR5 
and TA_CASH5—but higher volatility of cash-effective tax rates, consistent with a riskier tax 
planning activity.  
3.3 Replication of Hasan et al. (2014) 
Before implementing the path analysis, we first confirm the positive association between 
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tax avoidance, bond yields, and loan spreads, as documented by Hasan et al. (2014).  We 
estimate the following OLS regression model:  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  ∝1+  ∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + ∝3  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  +∝4  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +∝5 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹+∝6 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable, Y, is either offering bond yields or bank loan spreads. Offering bond 
yield is the yield to maturity of bonds computed at the time of issuance. Bank loan spread is 
the loan spread quoted in basis points over a floating benchmark (typically, the London 
Interbank Offered Rate). We use the logarithm of loan spreads in our empirical analysis to be 
consistent with Hasan et al. (2014). In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics on bond offering 
yields and bank loan spreads. The average bond-offering yield is 7.16%, whereas the average 
bank loan spread is 4.51%. Tax avoidance is one of the three tax avoidance proxies defined 
above.  
We control for a number of bond-specific characteristics in our bond sample 
regressions. These variables are described in Table 1, and a discussion of them is included in 
Appendix 1.  As reported in Table 1, the average rating of the bonds in our sample is 8.1, which 
is equivalent to a Standard and Poor’s “BBB+” rating. Sample bonds have, on average, a time 
until maturity of about 12 years, and a face value of US$179 million. About 4% of the sample 
bonds are subordinated, 49% are callable, 2% are putable, and 3% have a sinking fund 
provision in place. These averages are similar to the characteristics of the average bond in the 
Mergent database, suggesting that our filters pick a relatively representative sample of bonds. 
We also control for a number of loan-specific factors in our loan analyses, as listed in 
Table 1 and discussed in Appendix 1.  The average rating of loans in our sample is about 10, 
translating into “BBB-” rating. Sample loans have, on average, a time until maturity of about 
four years and a face value of US$424 million. About 48% of loans include a performance 
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pricing provision, 74% are revolvers, 95% are senior debt instruments, and 31% are secured. 
The average loan includes 1.3 financial covenants, three general covenants, and is financed by 
11 lenders. 
We include several firm-specific controls that are discussed in Appendix 1. All models 
include year-fixed effects to capture structural changes in the debt markets’ liquidity as well as 
general economic conditions over time. We also include industry-fixed effects (defined as per 
Fama and French 48 industry definitions) to mitigate industry related time-invariant factors 
that might drive our results. We control for autocorrelation in model errors by computing 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table 2 presents results of our Hasan et al.’s (2014) replication analysis. The association 
between tax avoidance and bond yields (bank loan spreads) is in Panel A (Panel B). The table 
reports coefficient estimates from OLS regression models together with t-statistics (in 
parentheses). To conserve space, we do not tabulate the estimated coefficients on all the control 
variables included in each regression. For the bond sample, the explanatory power of our model 
(adjusted R2) is relatively high at 79%, suggesting that the variables included are important 
drivers of bond-offering yields. We find a significant and negative association between the 
five-year cash ETR measure, CETR5, and the industry-size adjusted cash ETR, TA_CASH5, 
and bond offering yields, with a coefficient −0.567 (t-statistic = −3.30) and -0.618 (t-statistic 
= −3.22), respectively. We also find a significant positive association between the coefficient 
of variation in cash ETRs, CV_CETR5, and bond offering yields (coefficient = 0.143, t-statistic 
= 4.80), indicating yields are increasing in riskier tax avoidance.  
For the bank loan sample, the explanatory power of our model (adjusted R2) is also relatively 
high at 78%, again suggesting that our model captures the most important variables that drive 
loan spreads. We find a significant and negative association between the five-year cash ETR 
measure, CETR5, and the industry-size adjusted cash ETR, TA_CASH5, and logarithm of bank 
17 
 
loan spreads, with a coefficient −0.180 (t-statistic = −2.25) and -0.219 (t-statistic = −2.60), 
respectively. We also find a significant positive association between the coefficient of variation 
in cash ETRs, CV_CETR5, and bank loan spreads (coefficient of 0.040, t-statistic of 4.43), 
indicating spreads are increasing in riskier tax avoidance.8 Overall, our results are consistent 
with Hasan et al. and indicate that corporate bondholders and bank lenders view corporate tax 
avoidance activities negatively and, as a result, the cost of bonds and bank loans is increasing 
in tax avoidance.  
   
4. Path analyses 
4.1 The impact of tax avoidance on future cash flow levels, cash flow volatility, and 
information quality  
We investigate three possible paths through which tax avoidance could impact bond 
yields and loan spreads. Corporate tax avoidance activities could make future cash flows more 
uncertain due to tax risk or by facilitating managerial rent extraction that lowers future cash 
flow levels. Moreover, a third possible path is that tax-planning activities can result in a less 
transparent information environment due to these activities’ role in increasing the complexity 
of the firm. We test directly the impact of corporate tax avoidance on these potential channels 
by estimating the following regression on a sample of all non-financial Compustat firms having 
necessary data over our sample period 1990-2007:9   
                                                 
8 To mitigate the concern that the presence of large firms in the sample can affect our results, we reran the analyses 
after excluding the top 5% and 10% of total firm assets observations and found similar results. Hasan et al. (2014) 
use a firm-fixed effects model to control for omitted firm-specific, time-invariant factors. When we add firm-fixed 
effects, our results are qualitatively similar, with slightly smaller t-statistics, but each tax avoidance measure is 
still significant at least at the 5% level in both samples. 
9 We do not restrict the analysis here to the bond and loan samples, as we want to estimate the relations in a broad 
sample of firms. 
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 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4  =  ∝1+  ∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  + ∝3  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +∝4 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +∝5 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4 (2) 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is either Pre-tax cash flow level, defined as the 
average of pre-tax cash flow from operations scaled by total assets over the next five years, 
Pre-tax cash flow volatility, defined as the coefficient of variation of pre-tax cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets over the next five years, or Information quality.  
Information quality is our composite measure of information quality. Prior research 
(Frank et al. 2009; Balakrishnan et al. 2018) documents that tax planning results in less 
transparent financial reporting and information environments. We construct a composite 
measure of Information quality using the following seven financial reporting/information 
quality proxies: 
 a) The ratio of annual research and development expense (coded as 0 if missing) to sales 
averaged over the next five years. R&D expense is used by prior research to proxy for the 
presence of intangible assets, which are associated with higher information asymmetry (Barth 
and Kasznik 1999; Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 2001).  
b) The accrual quality measure, calculated as the standard deviation of residuals over the 
next five years from an industry-year level Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, augmented with 
fundamental variables from the Jones model (McNichols 2002).  
c) The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, calculated from the Jones Model 
averaged over the next five years (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005).  
d) The absolute analyst forecast error (AFE), calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between actual reported earnings and the latest IBES median consensus analyst 
forecast (reported immediately before the earnings announcement), scaled by the absolute 
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value of the latest IBES median consensus analyst forecast. To be consistent with other 
information quality proxies, we average AFE over the next five years.  
e) The analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as standard deviation of the forecasts 
included in the latest IBES consensus forecast, scaled by the absolute value of the latest IBES 
median consensus forecast and averaged over the next five years.  
f) The number of forecasts included in the latest IBES consensus analyst forecast and 
averaged over the next five years. We multiply this measure with -1 so that it captures a less 
transparent information environment.  
g) The average monthly bid-ask spread, scaled by the average of the absolute value of 
bid and ask prices and calculated over the next five years.  
We rank annually each of the seven information quality proxies above into deciles and 
standardize these deciles to be between 0 (high information quality) and 1 (low information 
quality). Information quality is the average of these seven standardized ranks.  
We report the results of estimating equation (2) in Table 3. The dependent variable in 
columns 1-3 is Pre-tax cash flow level. We find that the two cash ETR measures exhibit 
significant positive coefficients: lower ETRs are associated with lower future pre-tax cash 
flows, and greater tax avoidance leads to lower future cash flows. Riskier tax avoidance, 
proxied by CV_CETR5, is significantly negatively associated with future pre-tax cash flows.  
A one-standard deviation increase in tax avoidance, as measured by CETR5 (CV_CETR5), 
decreases future pre-tax cash flow levels by 0.8% (0.5%); this is an economically large effect, 
given that the average Pre-tax cash flow level (untabulated) in this sample is 14% of total assets.  
The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is Pre-tax cash flows volatility. Consistent with 
the conjecture that tax avoidance increases uncertainty in future cash flow levels, we find 
significant negative coefficients on our two cash ETR tax avoidance proxies, suggesting that 
tax avoidance also increases future cash flow volatility. Riskier tax avoidance, proxied by 
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CV_CETR5, is significantly positively associated with future pre-tax cash flow volatility. A 
one-standard deviation increase in tax avoidance, as measured by CETR5 (CV_CETR5), 
decreases future pre-tax cash flow levels by 0.073 (0.077). This number is economically 
significant, given that the average Pre-tax cash flows volatility in our sample is 0.871.  
Finally, the dependent variable in columns 7-9 is Information quality. We find significant 
and negative coefficients on our two cash ETR tax avoidance proxies, suggesting that tax 
avoidance is negatively associated with future information quality (recall information quality 
is scaled 0 high quality to 1 low quality). Riskier tax avoidance, proxied by CV_CETR5, is 
significantly positively associated with our information quality, consistent with riskier tax 
planning being associated with poorer future information quality. A one-standard deviation 
increase in tax avoidance, as measured by CETR5 (CV_CETR5), decreases future information 
quality by 0.002 (0.009).  However, this effect seems to be economically modest, given that 
the average Information quality in our sample is 0.433. The ability of the tax avoidance 
measures to predict lower future cash flow levels and higher cash flow volatility is consistent 
with the possibility that bond investors and bank lenders view tax avoidance behavior as an 
early indicator of problems in future cash flow levels and volatility, two variables that are first 
order determinants of a firm's cost of debt. 
4.2 Path analysis results  
While the above analysis suggests a relationship between tax avoidance and the cost of 
public debt and bank loan spreads through these three channels, it is silent on the importance 
of these channels. In particular, we cannot conclude whether the relationship between tax 
avoidance and the cost of bonds and bank loans is completely explained by, for example, the 
impact of tax avoidance on future pre-tax cash flows levels. The path analysis sheds more light 
on this issue. 
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Path analysis is a structural equation model used to decompose the correlation between 
two variables into a direct path and an indirect path through a mediating variable. In our paper, 
the path analysis decomposes the relationship between tax avoidance and the cost of debt into 
a direct path between these two variables and an indirect path through future cash flow levels, 
cash flow volatility, or information quality. The analysis automatically standardizes all 
variables in the model with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, allowing a 
comparison between direct and indirect path coefficients. We estimate the following model:  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  ∝1 +∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +∝3  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4   +∝4  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∝5  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+∝6 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +∝7 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4  =   𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4 (4) 
In the first equation, the dependent variable, Y, is either offering bond yields or bank loan 
spreads, as defined above, while in the second equation, the dependent variable, Channel, is 
either Pre-tax cash flow level, Pre-tax cash flow volatility, or Information quality. Appendix 2 
presents a graphical illustration of the direct and indirect (mediated) paths. The path coefficient 
in equation (3), ∝2, is the magnitude of the direct path from tax avoidance to the cost of bonds 
or bank loans, after including the mediating variables.  As noted by Zhao et al. (2010), an 
insignificant ∝2 coefficient is consistent with the mediating variables fully mediating the 
relation between tax avoidance and the cost of bonds or bank loans. We have no prediction as 
to whether our included mediating variables fully mediate the relation or not. The total 
magnitude of the indirect (mediated) path is given by the path coefficient β2 ∗ ∝3, where β2 is 
an estimate of the association between tax avoidance and the mediating variable, and  ∝3 is the 
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association between the mediating variable and bond yield or loan spreads. The percentage of 
the total path explained by the mediated path is given by (β2*∝3)/[∝2 +  β2*∝3]). 
We report the path coefficients in Table 4 (bond sample) and Table 5 (bank loan 
sample).10 For illustration purposes, the graphic in Appendix 2 includes the estimated 
coefficients of the model, using CETR5 as the tax avoidance measure from Panel A Table 4. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that after including future pre-tax cash flow level as the mediating 
variable, the direct path between bond yields and tax avoidance remains significantly negative  
for the two cash ETR measures and significantly positive for CV_CETR5. The indirect path 
coefficient, 𝛽𝛽2, for pre-tax cash flow level with the two cash ETR measures (CV_ETR5) is 
significantly positive (negative), suggesting that higher (riskier) tax avoidance results in lower 
future pre-tax cash flow levels (consistent with Table 3, where we use the larger Compustat 
sample). Moreover, the path coefficient between the pre-tax cash flow level and the offering 
yield, ∝3, is negative and significant for the two cash ETR measures. The total mediated path, 
𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3, is negative for the two cash ETR measures and positive for CV_CETR5. The 
percentage of the total path explained by the mediating variable, pre-tax cash flow level, is 
37%, 52%, and 2% for CETR5, TA_CASH5, and CV_CETR5, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports results for future pre-tax cash flows volatility as the mediating 
factor. Consistent with Panel A, the direct path between bond offering yields and tax avoidance 
is significant. When we look at the components of the mediated path, the indirect path 
coefficient between pre-tax cash flow volatility and the two cash ETR measures, (CV_ETR5) 
and 𝛽𝛽2, is significantly negative (positive), suggesting that higher (riskier) tax avoidance results 
in a higher future pre-tax cash flow volatility (again consistent with Table 3, which uses the 
larger Compustat sample). Moreover, as expected, the path coefficient between pre-tax cash 
                                                 
10 We did not employ these three channels as mediating variables at the same time, because they are highly 
correlated (for example, the Spearman correlation between cash flows level and volatility is -57% in our sample). 
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flow volatility and the offering yield, ∝3, is positive and significant for all three measures of 
tax avoidance. The total mediated path, 𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3, is negative for the two cash ETR measures and 
positive for CV_CETR5. The percentage of the total path explained by the mediating variable, 
pre-tax cash flow volatility, is 34%, 57%, and 6% for CETR5, TA_CASH5, and CV_CETR5, 
respectively, which are very similar to the percentages for the mediating variable pre-tax cash 
flow level.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 4 reports results for information opacity as the mediating factor. 
Consistent with Panels A and B, the direct path between bond offering yields and tax avoidance 
continues to be significant. When we look at components of the indirect path, the path between 
the two ETR proxies and information quality, 𝛽𝛽2, is only significantly negative for TA_CASH5 
and is significantly positive for CV_CETR5. On the other hand, as expected, the path between 
information quality and the bond offering yield, ∝3, is positive and significant (recall that 
higher values of information quality denote lower information quality). The percentage of the 
total path explained by the mediating variable, information quality, is 0%, 22%, and 20% for 
CETR5, TA_CASH5, and CV_CETR5, respectively.  
The path analysis for bank loan spreads is reported in Table 5.  Panel A shows that after 
including future pre-tax cash flow level as the mediating variable, the direct path between bank 
loan spreads and tax avoidance, ∝2,  is still statistically significant. The indirect path coefficient 
between the pre-tax future cash flow level and the two cash ETR measures, (CV_ETR5) 
and 𝛽𝛽2, is significantly positive (negative), suggesting that higher (riskier) tax avoidance results 
in lower future pre-tax cash flow levels. Moreover, the path coefficient between the pre-tax 
cash flow level and loan spreads, ∝3, is negative and significant. The total mediated path,  𝛽𝛽2 ∗
∝3, is negative for the two cash ETR measures and positive for CV_CETR5. The percentage of 
the total path explained by the mediating variable, pre-tax cash flows level, is 6%, 11%, and 
7% for CETR5, TA_CASH5, and CV_CETR5, respectively.  
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Panel B of Table 5 reports results for future pre-tax cash flows volatility as a mediating 
factor. Consistent with Panel A, the direct path between loan spreads and tax avoidance, ∝2,  is 
still significant. When we look at the components of the mediated path, the indirect path 
coefficient between future pre-tax cash flows volatility and the two cash ETR measures, 
(CV_ETR5) and 𝛽𝛽2, is significantly negative (positive). As expected, the path coefficient 
between pre-tax cash flow volatility and loan spreads, ∝3, is positive and significant. The total 
mediated path, 𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3, is negative for the two cash ETR measures and positive for CV_CETR5. 
The economic magnitude of the mediated path, however, is relatively small, as evidenced by 
the very low percentage of the total path explained by the mediating variable, pre-tax cash flow 
volatility, of less than 3% for each of the tax avoidance measures.   
Finally, Panel C of Table 5 examines the role of future information quality as the 
mediating factor. Consistent with Panels A and B, the direct path between loan spreads and tax 
avoidance, ∝2, is still statistically significant. When we look at the components of the mediated 
path, the path between the two ETR proxies and information quality, 𝛽𝛽2, is significantly 
negative and for CV_CETR5 is significantly positive. As expected, the path between 
information quality and loan spreads, ∝3, is positive and significant. The economic magnitude 
of the mediated path, however, is relatively small, as evidenced by the low percentage of the 
total path explained by the mediating variable, information quality, of 8%, 11%, and 20% for 
CETR5, TA_CASH5, and CV_CETR5, respectively.  
4.3. Path analysis discussion 
We draw several insights from the path analysis. First, the results indicate that there is a 
statistically significant direct path between tax avoidance and both bond offering yields and 
bank loan spreads, regardless of the mediating factor we employ. In other words, the path is 
not fully mediated, suggesting that other potential unidentified mediating paths may exist.  
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Second, we document a significant difference in the magnitude of the indirect paths 
within the bond and loan samples. Within the bond sample, we find that for the two cash ETR 
measures, pre-tax cash flows levels and volatility are relatively more important paths than 
information quality, while for CV_CETR5, information quality is a relatively more important 
path. Within the bank sample, we find that all three mediating variables explain only a small 
percentage of the total path, with the information quality path being somewhat more important 
than the two cash flow paths. A potential explanation for this result is the fact that banks rely 
a lot more on financial information when contracting with borrowers (e.g., they demand 
financial covenants and loan performance pricing that is a function of an accounting ratio). 
Third, there is a difference in the magnitude of the indirect paths between the bond and 
the loan samples. Future cash flows level and volatility, as well as information quality, matter 
more as mediating variables in the bond sample as compared to the loan sample. This is 
consistent with the idea that, relative to bond investors, banks rely less on public information 
when pricing the debt, presumably because they have access to borrowers’ private information. 
When we examine why channels are less important for the loan sample as compared to the 
bond sample, we find that, for the information quality channel, the difference in the indirect 
impact comes mainly from the ∝3  coefficient being much lower in the bank sample than the 
bond sample, further supporting the idea that banks are less likely to use public information to 
price debt.  
On the other hand, for the future cash flows level and volatility channels, both the path 
coefficients, ∝3  and β2, are higher in the bond sample as compared to the loan sample.  It is 
important to highlight that tax avoidance predicts lower levels and higher volatile future pre-
tax cash flows in the bond sample, and therefore debt costs are much more sensitive to these 
channels in the bond sample. This does not mean that banks are not concerned about future 
cash flows issues. It means, rather, that banks have alternative sources of information about 
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lenders’ future cash flows, and hence are less likely to take into account public signals, here 
related to tax avoidance, about future cash flows. Bank loans contracts are more likely to 
include financial covenants, which lead to increased monitoring and frequent loan 
renegotiations that facilitate access to additional private information about borrowers (see 
Roberts 2015). Furthermore, bank debt is often collateralized with borrowers’ assets, while 
bonds are not. Given the protection offered by the presence of collateral and covenants, banks 
might not rely as much on future cash flows when pricing the debt as bond investors do.  
To further explore banks’ information needs and monitoring intensity, in unreported 
results, we partition our bank loan sample into two subsamples at the median level of number 
of loan covenants and run our path analyses separately for high versus low covenant package 
samples. We argue that banks have higher information needs and monitor more intensely when 
the loan package includes more covenants. These analyses reveal two key results: First, we 
find that the direct path is lower and mostly insignificant when the loan contract includes above 
the median number of covenants. This result suggests that when banks increase monitoring 
intensity, loan spreads are less sensitive to tax avoidance and its future potential negative 
effects. Second, the magnitude of the indirect path is smaller when the loan contract includes 
above the median number of covenants. This reinforces the argument that banks have 
alternative channels to access borrowers’ private information (e.g., via loan covenant 
renegotiations), and hence are less likely to use public information to price loans.  
 
5. Cross-sectional analyses for bond and bank loan samples 
In the previous set of analyses, we show that corporate tax avoidance activities are 
negatively associated with bond offering yields mainly, but not bank loan spreads, due to the 
negative consequences of these activities on future cash flows. In this section, we investigate 
whether the negative association is increasing with ex ante proxies for rent extraction and tax 
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risk. Specifically, we partition our bond and loan samples based on variables that capture 
incentives for lender wealth expropriation (presence of antitakeover provisions, presence of 
large blockholders, high risk-taking incentives for management, and high credit risk) and tax 
risk (the probability of an IRS audit). We then test for differences in the relation between tax 
avoidance and bond offering yields and bank loan spreads. Results for the bond sample are 
reported in Table 6 and for the bank loan sample in Table 7. 
5.1. Lender wealth expropriation 
We use Gompers et al. (2003) antitakeover G-Index as our first proxy for wealth 
expropriation because it provides an indication of the extent to which the management of the 
company is protected from the corporate takeover market. We split each sample into two 
groups according to the median G-Index every year. Observations that have higher (lower) than 
median G-Index scores are characterized by lower (greater) management monitoring by the 
takeover market. We estimate the empirical specification in Equation (1) separately for high 
and low G-Index sub-samples.11 Panel A of Table 6 reports regression results for the high and 
low governance quality partitions for the bond sample. We find no evidence of an association 
between our proxies of tax avoidance and bond offering yields in the high monitoring (high 
governance) group.  
However, we find a significant negative association between our proxies of tax 
avoidance and bond offering yields for the low monitoring group, suggesting that the results in 
Table 2 are generally driven by the low monitoring group. In terms of economic magnitude for 
the low monitoring group, the coefficients indicate an 18-basis-points effect for the two cash 
ETR measures and a 15-basis-points effect for CV_CETR5, for a one standard deviation change 
in the tax avoidance measures. Results for the bank loan sample are reported in Panel A, Table 
                                                 
11 We follow this empirical strategy instead of interacting tax avoidance proxies with the indicator for greater 
management monitoring captured by a low G-Index to ensure that all control variables vary with this indicator. 
We could interact all control variables with the G-Index dummy, but this is likely to result in multicollinearity.  
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7. Our three tax avoidance proxies are significantly associated with loan spreads in both the 
high and low governance quality partitions, except CETR5, which is not significant in the low 
governance quality subsample.  There is no difference on bank loan spreads across the two 
groups except for the smaller effect of low governance quality using the CETR5 measure. We 
conclude that tax avoidance negatively impacts the cost of public debt but not the cost of bank 
loans for firms characterized by poor management monitoring; these firms are more likely to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders and report lower future cash flows.  
Our second proxy for lender wealth expropriation is the presence of large blockholders. 
We split the bond and loan samples into two groups based on the extent to which blockholders 
own shares in the company.12 Observations with a higher (lower) than the median ownership 
of blockholders are classified as having high (low) ownership concentration. We expect that 
the association between bond yields/bank loan spreads and tax avoidance is stronger when 
firms have a higher ownership by blockholders, if these shareholders are opportunistic.  
Table 6, Panel B documents that our results in Table 2 are generally driven by firms 
with high blockholder ownership, suggesting that bondholders view corporate tax avoidance 
activities negatively only when the firm has concentrated ownership, presumably because they 
think that money saved through tax avoidance activities might be expropriated by large 
shareholders. In the bank loan sample, Table 7, panel B, our three tax avoidance proxies are 
significantly associated with bank loan spreads in both the high and low ownership 
concentration partitions. The loan spread-tax avoidance relation is significantly different only 
for the TA_CASH5 tax avoidance measure, where it is more negative in the low ownership 
concentration partition. Our results suggest that bondholders are more concerned about 
blockholder rent expropriation than bank lenders.    
                                                 
12 We obtain institutional investment data from Thomson Reuters 13f files. 
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Our third proxy for lender wealth expropriation is the presence of high equity incentives. 
We thus examine the relationship between tax avoidance and bond yields/loan spreads as a 
function of managerial equity risk incentives. As we discussed in Section 2.3, if equity risk 
incentives motivate managers to make risky investing and financing decisions to increase the 
value of their stock option portfolios, we expect the results to be more pronounced for firms 
with high managerial equity incentives. Our proxy for managerial equity incentives is CEO 
vega, measured as sensitivity of a CEO’s stock option portfolio to a given change in stock 
return volatility (Guay 1999). We obtain CEO vega data for the period 1993-2007. We partition 
our samples into firms with low versus high equity risk incentives at the median of CEO vega 
in every year; those above the median are referred to as high equity risk incentives.  
The bond sample results are reported in Panel C of Table 6. We find that tax avoidance 
negatively impacts the bond debt yields in both low and high equity risk incentives groups. The 
results are significantly more pronounced in the high equity risk incentives group for the two 
cash ETR measures. Within the bank sample reported in Panel C of Table 7, loan spreads are 
not generally associated with tax avoidance in the low equity risk incentives partition, but are 
significant in the high risk incentives partition, with the difference being significant for all three 
tax avoidance measures. These results suggest that both bondholders and banks demand price-
protection for firms with high equity risk incentives.  
Finally, our last proxy for lender wealth expropriation is the borrower’s credit quality. 
We investigate how the credit quality of the firm, proxied by the magnitude of its bond rating 
or loan credit rating, impacts the relationship between tax avoidance and the bond yields/loan 
spreads. Speculative grade bonds (loans) are more likely to go into default, causing large losses 
for bondholders (bank lenders); thus their equity holders have greater incentives to engage in 
asset substitution and wealth expropriation to increase the value of their claims. Therefore, we 
expect our results to be stronger for firms with speculative grade bonds and loans. A bond 
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(loan) is deemed to be investment grade (speculative grade) bond (loan) if its rating is BBB+ 
or better (lower than BBB+).  
Our results for the bond sample are reported in Panel D of Table 6. Consistent with our 
expectation, we find that tax avoidance negatively impacts cost of bond debt in both investment 
and speculative grade bond groups. However, results are significantly stronger in the 
speculative grade bond group for all three tax avoidance measures. In the bank loan sample as 
reported in Panel D of Table 7, CETR5 is not significant within either partition, TA_CASH5 is 
significantly more negative in the speculative grade partition, and while CV_CETR5 is 
significant in the investment grade partition, there is no difference across the two partitions. 
Thus, bondholders appear more concerned than bank lenders about tax avoidance when firms 
have lower credit quality.  
5.2 IRS audit probability 
In the last set of tests, we investigate the relationship between tax avoidance and bond 
yields/bank loan spreads as a function of the IRS face-to-face audit probability. Lenders may 
perceive the IRS as a monitor that reduces agency costs or as increasing the tax risk due to 
penalties. We utilize information from Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) system to test the impact of the audit probability. This database 
provides the percentage of audited tax returns as a function of firm size in the period 1992-
2007. We partition our samples into firms with low versus high ex ante audit probability 
relative to the median of IRS audit probability – those above the median are referred to as high 
IRS audit probability.  
In Table 6, Panel E, we find that corporate tax avoidance negatively impacts the bond 
yields generally in the sub-sample of bonds with high IRS audit probability, with significant 
differences for the two cash ETR measures. Somewhat surprisingly for the bank sample as 
reported in Panel E of Table 7, tax avoidance has larger effects in the low IRS audit probability 
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partition at least for the two cash ETR measures, but the differences are not significant across 
the two partitions for all three tax avoidance measures. Overall, the results suggest that 
bondholders perceive the IRS as an institution that increases tax risk, presumably by penalizing 
firms that avoid paying taxes.13 
6. Conclusion  
Public debt (or bond debt) and bank loans are prominent in the capital structure of firms, 
with issuances in the debt market being significantly larger than in the equity market. 
Therefore, investigating the determinants of the cost of bonds and bank loans is critical in 
enhancing our understanding of the firm’s capital structure and overall cost of capital. While 
the prior literature documents that bond yields and bank loan spreads are increasing in tax 
avoidance (Hasan et al. 2014), it does not shed light on the mechanism that drives this 
relationship.  
We document that firms engaging in corporate tax avoidance activities experience 
significantly lower future pre-tax cash flow levels, greater future pre-tax cash flow volatility, 
and, to a lesser extent, lower information quality. We use a path analysis to estimate the 
magnitude of the effects of these three channels through which tax avoidance impacts bond 
offering yields and bank loan spreads. For the bond sample, we find that corporate tax 
avoidance has both direct and indirect effects on bond offering yields, with the main indirect 
effect arising through lower future pre-tax cash flow levels and higher future pre-tax cash flow 
volatility. Information quality appears to have small, indirect effects. For the bank loan sample, 
we find that our three mediating (path) variables, future cash flow levels, cash volatility, and 
                                                 
13 Banks have access to private information about borrowers through private communications. These 
communications take place given banks’ other relationships with the borrowers (treasury, advisory, prior lending), 
and also because loan contracts are often renegotiated (see Roberts, 2015). Therefore, banks may not need a public 
signal about the probability of IRS audit when pricing the loans. Please note that when the probability of IRS audit 
is high, the borrower will not necessarily be subject to an IRS audit. Similarly, if the IRS audit probability is low, 
it does not mean that the borrower will be exempt from an IRS audit. Banks’ private information about a borrower 
can help them identify whether a borrower will be subject to an IRS audit with a greater precision both in low and 
high IRS audit probability samples. Hence, the public signal of IRS audit probability (prior audit probability based 
on year and firm size) might not be very useful and timely. 
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information quality, have little effect. Additional cross-sectional analyses indicate that tax 
avoidance only increases the cost of bonds, but not bank loans, when firms’ management has 
incentives to expropriate creditors’ wealth and when the probability of an IRS audit is high.  
These cross-sectional results suggest that banks can mitigate information asymmetry more 
effectively, given their access to borrowers’ private information and their close monitoring 
activities.  
Our research contributes to the emerging stream of literature that examines how lenders 
view corporate tax avoidance activities. Our results suggest that the impact of tax avoidance 
on bond offering yields (but not bank spreads) is mediated by future cash flows concerns as 
opposed to information quality.  
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Appendix 1: Control variables 
We control for a number of bond-specific characteristics in our regression of tax avoidance on bond 
yields. We include U.S. Treasury bill rates (T-bill rate) to control for shifts in benchmark interest rates and the 
time preference for money. Rating measures the credit quality of the bond issue as assessed by one of the three 
main certified rating agencies (i.e., Standard and Poors, Fitch, or Moody’s).14 Life is the maturity of the bond in 
years. Amount of issue is the total dollar face value of the bond issue. Subordinated is an indicator variable that 
takes the value 1 if the bond is subordinated to other debt securities and 0 otherwise. Callable is an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is callable and 0 otherwise. Putable is an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if the bond is putable and 0 otherwise. Sinkingfund is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
sinking fund exists and 0 otherwise.  
Besides Rating, Life, and Amount of issue as defined above, we control for a long list of loan-specific factors 
in our loan analyses. Performance pricing is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan includes a performance 
pricing provision and 0 otherwise.  Debt repayment purpose is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan was 
taken to repay existing debt and 0 otherwise. Investment purpose is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan was 
taken to invest for corporate purposes and 0 otherwise. Working capital purpose is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the loan was taken to finance working capital needs and 0 otherwise. Financial covenants is the number of 
financial-based covenants in the loan contract. General covenants is the number of general covenants in the loan 
contract. Number of lenders is the number of individual banks that participate in the loan syndicate. Revolver is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is revolving and 0 otherwise. Term mix is the percentage of individual 
loans in the loan package with a specified repayment schedule and maturity. Senior is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the loan is senior and 0 otherwise. Secure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured and 0 
otherwise. 
We also control for several firm-specific characteristics that are measured in the fiscal year immediately 
prior to a given bond/loan’s issuance. We use Market to book, as measured by the firm’s market-to-book ratio at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the issuance of a debt instrument, to capture firm growth opportunities. Return 
on asset is pretax income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
debt issuance. Leverage is the sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term liabilities, scaled by total 
                                                 
14 As discussed earlier, Crabtree and Maher (2009) and Ayers et al. (2010) show that credit ratings are a function 
of book-tax differences. Thus, by including credit ratings, we are documenting that the association between bond 
issuance yields and tax avoidance is incremental to the effect of tax avoidance effects on bond yields via credit 
ratings.  
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assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to debt issuance. Log(Assets) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the issuance of a debt instrument. Finally, we include the coefficient of 
variation of the firm’s net operating pre-tax cash flows (scaled by total assets) calculated over the five years prior 
to debt issuance, CV_Pre-tax cash flows.  
Finally, we also control for firm characteristics that prior literature suggests are correlated with our tax 
avoidance measures to ensure that our results are incremental to these factors that might drive fundamental 
differences in our sample firms (e.g., Mills 1998; Manzon and Plesko 2002; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008, Frank 
et al. 2009). Loss carry forward is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the loss carry forward is positive 
and 0 otherwise, while Change in loss carry forward is change in the loss carry forward scaled by lagged assets. 
Loss carry forwards could be used to reduce future tax payments and can be positively viewed by debtholders.  
Foreign income is foreign income scaled by lagged assets. PPE is property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged 
assets. Intangible assets is intangible assets scaled by lagged assets. Equity income is income in earnings from 
investments accounted using the equity method scaled by lagged assets.15 
                                                 
15 We do not include information quality in the regression, as this variable is a path through which tax avoidance 
is hypothesized to affect bond yields.  Omission of a path variable (also known as a mediating variable) does not 
lead to a correlated omitted variables problem. We analyze this path below. See Zhao et al. (2010) for further 
discussion. 
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Appendix 2: Path analysis example 
 
Tables 4 and 5 document results from path analyses in equations (3) and (4) that examine the effect of corporate 
tax avoidance on cost of debt directly and through three channels (i.e., cash flows level, cash flows volatility, and 
information quality). We include one example below (first column of Table 4 Panel A) to show how to interpret 
the path analyses coefficients.  
  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  ∝1 +∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +∝3  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4   +∝4  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∝5  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+∝6 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +∝7 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3)  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4  =   𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4 (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total mediated (indirect) path ( 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ ∝3) =  −0.020 
Total path ( 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ ∝3+ ∝2) =  −0.054 
Mediated path/Total path % = 37% 
 
 
 
  
Tax avoidance 
(CETR5) 
Channel 
(Pre-tax cash flows) 
Cost of debt 
(Offering bond yield) 
∝2=  −0.034 
 𝛽𝛽2 =  0.217 ∝3=  −0.094 
Direct path 
Indirect path 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
CETR5 is cash effective tax rate averaged over the last five years. TA_CASH5 is CETR5 minus the firm’s mean 
year-industry-size CETR5. CV_CETR5 is coefficient of variation of cash effective tax rate over the last five years.  
 
Offering bond yield is the bond’s percentage yield to maturity at issuance. T-bill rate is the percentage matched 
T-bill rate. Rating is the numerical credit rating of the bond issue, where lower values mean higher credit quality. 
We use Rating orthogonalized to all other variables in the empirical analyses. The Life is the bond’s maturity in 
years. The Amount of issue is the total dollar face value of the bond issue. Subordinated is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the bond is subordinated to other debt securities and 0 otherwise. Callable is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the bond is callable and 0 otherwise. Putable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bond is putable 
and 0 otherwise. Sinkingfund is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bond has a sinking fund feature and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Market to book is the firm’s market-to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal year prior to bond issuance. Return on 
asset is pretax income before special items, scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to bond issuance. 
Leverage is the sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term liabilities, scaled by total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to bond issuance. Assets is the firm’s total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
bond issuance. The CV_Pre-tax cash flows is the coefficient of variation of net operating cash flows before tax 
payments (obtained from the cash flow statement), scaled by total assets and calculated over the five fiscal years 
immediately prior to bond issuance. Loss carry forward is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if loss carry 
forward is positive and 0 otherwise. Change in loss carry forward is change in loss carry forward scaled by lagged 
assets. Foreign income is foreign income scaled by lagged assets. PPE is property, plant, and equipment scaled 
by lagged assets. Intangible assets is intangible assets scaled by lagged assets. Equity income is equity income in 
earnings scaled by lagged assets. 
 
Loan spread is loan spread quoted in basis points over a floating benchmark, multiplied by 100. Rating is 
numerical credit rating of the loan issue where lower values represent higher credit quality. We use Rating 
orthogonalized to all other variables in the empirical analyses. Life is loan maturity in years. Amount of issue is 
total dollar face value of the loan issue. Performance pricing is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan has 
performance pricing provision and 0 otherwise. Debt repayment purpose is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
loan is taken to repay existing debt and 0 otherwise. Investment purpose is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
loan is taken for corporate investment purposes and 0 otherwise. Working capital purpose is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the loan is taken to finance working capital needs and 0 otherwise. Financial covenants is the number 
of financial covenants in the loan contract. General covenants is the number of general covenants in the loan 
contract. Number of lenders is the number of individual banks that participate in the loan. Revolver is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the loan is revolving and 0 otherwise. Term mix is the percentage of individual loans in the 
loan package with a specified repayment schedule and maturity. Senior is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
loan is senior and 0 otherwise. Secure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured and 0 otherwise. 
 
The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
one percentiles. There are 7,945 (6,015) observations in the bond (loan) sample. +++, ++, and + indicate that the 
means (medians) between bond and loan samples are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, in two-tailed t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (cont.) 
 
 
 Bond Sample Loan Sample 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tax avoidance proxies     
CETR5 0.245 0.247 0.261+++ 0.266+++ 
TA_CASH5 -0.022 -0.019 -0.008+++ -0.005+++ 
CV_CETR5 0.523 0.336 0.667+++ 0.423+++ 
     
Firm characteristics     
Market to book 3.050 2.132 3.239+++ 2.259 
Return on asset 0.100 0.082 0.113+++ 0.096+++ 
Leverage 0.411 0.373 0.404 0.350+++ 
Assets (in millions) 12,022 6,523 4,946+++ 1,897+++ 
CV_Pre-tax cash flows 0.317 0.203 0.511+++ 0.286+++ 
Loss carry forward 0.161 0.000 0.241+++ 0.000+++ 
Change in loss carry forward 0.001 0.000 0.001+++ 0.000 
Foreign income 0.014 0.000 0.015++ 0.000 
PPE 0.568 0.587 0.444+++ 0.363+++ 
Intangible assets 0.113 0.022 0.199+++ 0.104+++ 
Equity income 0.002 0.000 0.001+++ 0.000+++ 
     
Bond and loan characteristics     
Offering bond yield 7.160 7.098   
Loan spread   4.511 4.471 
T-bill rate 5.903 6.000   
Rating 8.083 8.000 9.871++ 10.000++ 
Life 11.841 10.000 3.898+++ 4.925+++ 
Amount of issue (in millions) 179 100 424+++ 250+++ 
Subordinated 0.039 0.000   
Callable 0.489 1.000   
Putable 0.018 0.000   
Sinkingfund 0.029 0.000   
Performance pricing   0.480 0.000 
Debt repayment purpose   0.166 0.000 
Investment purpose   0.176 0.000 
Working capital purpose   0.406 0.000 
Financial covenants   1.344 1.000 
General covenants   2.528 2.000 
Number of lenders   11.403 9.000 
Revolver   0.742 1.000 
Term mix   0.220 0.000 
Senior   0.948 1.000 
Secure   0.310 0.000 
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Table 2: Multivariate analyses for the bonds and loans sample 
 
This table reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields (Panel A) and loan spreads (Panel B). The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-
indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and 
French 48 industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Bonds sample 
 
 1 2 3 
Tax avoidance measures    
CETR5 −0.567 
(−3.30) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.618 
(−3.22) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.143 
(4.80) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,945 7,945 7,945 
Adj. R2 0.787 0.787 0.786 
 
Panel B: Loans sample 
 
 1 2 3 
Tax avoidance measures    
CETR5 −0.180 
(−2.25) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.219 
(−2.60) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.040 
(4.43) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,015 6,015 6,015 
Adj. R2 0.778 0.778 0.778 
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Table 3: The impact of tax avoidance on future cash flows level, volatility, and information quality 
 
This table reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on future cash flows level, volatility, and information quality. The 
dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the average of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets over the next five years. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the 
coefficient of variation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets over the next five years. The dependent variable in columns 7-9 is the average of composite 
information quality measure over the next five years. The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
onepercentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 
48 industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Pre-tax cash flows level Pre-tax cash flows volatility Information quality 
Tax avoidance measures          
CETR5 0.063 
(8.93) 
  −0.586 
(−4.27) 
  −0.014 
(−1.29) 
  
TA_CASH5  0.066 
(8.64) 
  −0.590 
(−3.99) 
  −0.020 
(−1.73) 
 
CV_CETR5   -0.005 
(-6.17) 
  0.085 
(4.63) 
  0.010 
(8.22) 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 29,159 
Adj. R2 0.318 0.318 0.314 0.100 0.099 0.100 0.517 0.517 0.520 
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Table 4: Bond sample path analysis 
 
This panel reports the results from path analyses in equations (3) and (4) that examine the effect of corporate tax 
avoidance on bond-offering yields directly and through cash flows level (Panel A), cash flows volatility (Panel 
B), or information quality (Panel C). p(X1,X2) stands for standardized path coefficient. The sample period is 
between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-
values are reported in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry 
definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2.  
  𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  ∝1 +∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +∝3  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4   +∝4  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∝5  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+∝6 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +∝7 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3)  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4  =   𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4 (4) 
 
 
 
Panel A: Pre-tax cash flows level as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Offering yield)  ∝2  −0.034 
(−5.12) 
−0.029 
(−4.44) 
0.051 
(8.37) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Cash flows level) β2 0.217 
(19.50) 
0.331 
(31.81) 
−0.115 
(−9.99) 
p(Cash flows level, Offering yield) ∝3  
 
−0.094 
(−16.67) 
−0.092 
(−15.91) 
−0.007 
(−1.26) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  
 
−0.020 
 
−0.031 
 
0.001 
 
Mediated path/Total path % 
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 37% 52% 2% 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,326 7,326 7,326 
Equation 4 R2 0.784 0.786 0.798 
Equation 5 R2 0.047 0.110 0.013 
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Panel B: Pre-tax cash flows volatility as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Offering yield) ∝2  −0.031 
(−4.78) 
−0.023 
(−3.66) 
0.051 
(8.44) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Cash flows volatility)β2 −0.137 
(−11.95) 
−0.259 
(−23.75) 
0.065 
(5.58) 
p(Cash flows volatility, Offering yield) ∝3  
 
0.120 
(21.92) 
0.119 
(21.28) 
0.049 
(9.16) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  −0.016 
 
−0.031 
 
0.003 
 
Mediated path/Total path %  
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 34% 57% 6% 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,326 7,326 7,326 
Equation 4 R2 0.793 0.794 0.795 
Equation 5 R2 0.019 0.067 0.004 
 
Panel C: Information quality as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Offering yield)  ∝2  −0.047 
(−7.14) 
−0.039 
(−6.15) 
0.052 
(8.36) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Information quality) β2 0.003 
(0.29) 
−0.085 
(−7.32) 
0.175 
(15.48) 
p(Information quality, Offering yield) ∝3  
 
0.131 
(23.54) 
0.128 
(23.05) 
0.076 
(13.92) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  
 
0.000 
 
−0.011 
 
0.013 
 
Mediated path/Total path %  
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 0% 22% 20% 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,326 7,326 7,326 
Equation 4 R2 0.783 0.784 0.791 
Equation 5 R2 0.000 0.007 0.031 
 
 
 
 
  
46 
 
Table 5: Loan sample path analysis 
 
This panel reports the results from path analyses in equations E4 and E5 that examine the effect of corporate tax 
avoidance on loan spreads directly and through cash flows level (Panel A), cash flows volatility (Panel B), or 
information quality (Panel C). p(X1,X2) stands for standardized path coefficient. The sample period is between 
1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values are 
reported in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry definitions. 
Variables are defined in Table 2.  
  𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  =  ∝1 +∝2  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +∝3  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4   +∝4  𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∝5  𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+∝6 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +∝7 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4)  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4  =   𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡+4 (5) 
 
 
Panel A: Pre-tax cash flows level as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Loan spread)  ∝2  −0.033 
(−4.37) 
−0.031 
(−4.29) 
0.038 
(5.27) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Cash flows level) β2 0.052 
(3.77) 
0.118 
(8.66) 
−0.072 
(−5.20) 
p(Cash flows level, Loan spread) ∝3  
 
−0.036 
(−5.33) 
−0.035 
(−5.26) 
−0.035 
(−5.20) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  
 
−0.002 
 
−0.004 
 
0.003 
 
Mediated path/Total path %  
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 6% 11% 7% 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,214 5,214 5,214 
Equation 4 R2 0.768 0.768 0.769 
Equation 5 R2 0.003 0.014 0.005 
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Panel B: Pre-tax cash flows volatility as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Loan spread) ∝2  −0.036 
(−4.82) 
−0.034 
(−4.76) 
0.039 
(5.34) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Cash flows volatility)β2 −0.049 
(−3.57) 
−0.103 
(−7.51) 
0.054 
(3.94) 
p(Cash flows volatility, Loan spread) ∝3  
 
0.012 
(1.85) 
0.012 
(1.81) 
0.012 
(1.76) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  −0.001 
 
−0.001 
 
0.001 
 
Mediated path/Total path %  
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 3% 3% 3% 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,214 5,214 5,214 
Equation 4 R2 0.774 0.774 0.771 
Equation 5 R2 0.002 0.011 0.003 
 
Panel C: Information quality as the mediating variable 
 
 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
 CETR5 TA_CASH5 CV_CETR5 
Direct Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Loan spread)  ∝2  −0.036 
 (−4.70) 
−0.032 
(−4.50) 
0.036 
(4.83) 
Mediated Path    
p(Tax avoidance, Information quality) β2 −0.056 
(−4.06) 
−0.075 
(−5.43) 
0.177 
(13.16) 
p(Information quality, Loan spread) ∝3  
 
0.051 
(7.56) 
0.051 
(7.57) 
0.051 
(7.42) 
Total mediated path β2*∝3  
 
−0.003 
 
−0.004 
 
0.009 
 
Mediated path/Total path %  
(β2*∝3)/(∝2+ (𝛽𝛽2 ∗∝3)) 8% 11% 20% 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,214 5,214 5,214 
Equation 4 R2 0.761 0.768 0.766 
Equation 5 R2 0.004 0.006 0.031 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analyses for the bonds sample 
 
Panel A: Multivariate analyses for the bonds sample conditioned on governance quality 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields. We divided the sample into high and low corporate governance quality by splitting it 
according to median Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (G-Index) Index per year. Observations that have higher than 
median G-Index scores are classified as low corporate governance quality. The sample period is between 1990 
and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported 
in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according 
to Fama and French 48 industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the 
coefficients between high and low governance quality groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 High Governance Quality Low Governance Quality 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.259 
(−0.77) 
  −1.477++ 
(−6.50) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.181 
(−0.55) 
  −1.661+++ 
(−6.34) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.093 
(1.67) 
  0.179+++ 
(4.25) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,397 2,397 2,397 
Adj. R2 0.825 0.826 0.823 0.730 0.730 0.730 
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analyses for the bonds sample conditioned on ownership concentration 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields. We divided the sample into high and low ownership concentration by splitting it according 
to median ownership of block ownership. The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 
industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and 
low ownership concentration groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in 
two-tailed tests. 
 
 Low Ownership Concentration High Ownership Concentration 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.695 
(−2.75) 
  −1.231++ 
(−3.89) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.711 
(−2.84) 
  −1.422+ 
(−4.04) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.105 
(2.11) 
  0.170 
(4.11) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,130 3,130 3,130 3,148 3,148 3,148 
Adj. R2 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.771 0.771 0.779 
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Panel C: Multivariate analyses for the bonds sample conditioned on equity risk incentives 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields. We divided the sample into high and low equity risk incentives by splitting it according to 
the median vega of CEO option portfolio. The sample period is between 1993 and 2007. All non-indicator 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 
industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and 
low equity risk incentives groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
 
 Low Equity Risk Incentives High Equity Risk Incentives 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.589 
(−2.49) 
  −0.954+ 
(−3.54) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.524 
(−2.03) 
  −1.151+++ 
(−3.69) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.165 
(3.13) 
  0.152 
(3.96) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,815 2,815 2,815 
Adj. R2 0.773 0.774 0.773 0.778 0.777 0.777 
 
 
 
Panel D: Multivariate analyses for the bonds sample conditioned on bond rating 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields. A bond is deemed to be investment grade (speculative grade) bond if its rating is BBB+ or 
better (lower than BBB+). The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry 
definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between investment and 
speculative grade bond groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
 
 Investment grade bond Speculative grade bond 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.387 
(−2.06) 
  −1.190+++ 
(−5.50) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.485 
(−2.37) 
  −1.777++ 
(−7.79) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.089 
(2.77) 
  0.228+++ 
(7.49) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,712 4,712 4,712 3,233 3,348 3,348 
Adj. R2 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.775 0.774 0.775 
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Panel E: Multivariate analyses for the bonds sample conditioned on IRS audit probability 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
bond-offering yields. We divided the sample into high and low IRS audit probability by splitting it according to 
the median IRS audit probability. IRS audit probability is obtained from Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) website. The sample period is between 1992 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry 
definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and low IRS 
audit probability groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 Low IRS Audit Probability High IRS Audit Probability 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.126 
(−0.50) 
  −0.911+++ 
(−4.62) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.416 
(−1.54) 
  −0.916+++ 
(−4.02) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.146 
(3.68) 
  0.161 
(4.77) 
Bond-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,691 3,691 3,691 3,629 3,686 3,686 
Adj. R2 0.776 0.776 0.773 0.774 0.773 0.774 
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Table 7: Cross-sectional analyses for the loans sample 
 
Panel A: Multivariate analyses for the loans sample conditioned on governance quality 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
loan spreads. We divided the sample into high and low corporate governance quality by splitting it according to 
the median Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (G-Index) Index per year. Observations that have higher than median G-
Index scores are classified as low corporate governance quality. The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. 
All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according 
to Fama and French 48 industry definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the 
coefficients between high and low governance quality groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 High Governance Quality Low Governance Quality 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.380 
(−2.71) 
  −0.217+ 
(−1.50) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.413 
(−2.64) 
  −0.277 
(−1.91) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.036 
(1.95) 
  0.041 
(4.25) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,739 1,739 1,739 1,869 1,869 1,869 
Adj. R2 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.769 0.769 0.768 
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analyses for the loans sample conditioned on ownership concentration 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
loan spreads. We divided the sample into high and low ownership concentration by splitting it according to the 
median ownership of block ownership. The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry 
definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and low 
ownership concentration groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
 
 Low Ownership Concentration High Ownership Concentration 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.221 
(−1.92) 
  −0.226 
(−1.99) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.313 
(−2.56) 
  −0.185+ 
(−4.04) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.044 
(2.71) 
  0.050 
(3.66) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 
Adj. R2 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.780 0.781 0.780 
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Panel C: Multivariate analyses for the loans sample conditioned on equity risk incentives 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
loan spreads. We divided the sample into high and low equity risk incentives by splitting it according to the median 
vega of CEO option portfolio. The sample period is between 1993 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry 
definitions. Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and low 
equity risk incentives groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
 
 Low Equity Risk Incentives High Equity Risk Incentives 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.144 
(−1.14) 
  −0.352+ 
(−2.64) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.112 
(−0.84) 
  −0.429++ 
(−3.25) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.042 
(2.83) 
  0.076++ 
(3.57) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,226 
Adj. R2 0.786 0.786 0.785 0.776 0.776 0.776 
 
 
 
Panel D: Multivariate analyses for the loans sample conditioned on loan rating 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
loan spreads. A loan is deemed to be an investment grade (speculative grade) loan if its rating is BBB+ or better 
(lower than BBB+). The sample period is between 1990 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry definitions. 
Variables are defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between investment and speculative 
grade bond groups are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 Investment grade loan Speculative gradeloan 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.151 
(−1.81) 
  −0.203 
(−1.11) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.144 
(−1.65) 
  −0.427+++ 
(−2.12) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.039 
(4.29) 
  0.045 
(1.74) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,546 4,546 4,546 1,469 1,469 1,469 
Adj. R2 0.703 0.703 0.703 0.590 0.591 0.590 
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Panel E: Multivariate analyses for the loans sample conditioned on IRS audit probability 
This panel reports the results from OLS estimation models that examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance on 
loan spreads. We divided the sample into high and low IRS audit probability by splitting it according to the median 
IRS audit probability. IRS audit probability is obtained from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC) website. The sample period is between 1992 and 2007. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the 
top and bottom one percentiles. The t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Industry-fixed effects are defined according to Fama and French 48 industry definitions. Variables are 
defined in Table 2. +++, ++, and + indicate that the coefficients between high and low IRS audit probability groups 
are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 Low IRS Audit Probability High IRS Audit Probability 
Tax avoidance measures       
CETR5 −0.255 
(−2.62) 
  −0.157 
(−1.35) 
  
TA_CASH5  −0.298 
(−2.99) 
  −0.156 
(−1.21) 
 
CV_CETR5   0.045 
(3.92) 
  0.045 
(3.24) 
Loan-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,106 3,106 3,106 2,733 2,733 2,733 
Adj. R2 0.823 0.823 0.822 0.774 0.774 0.774 
 
